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In the present study we addressed two novel questions: (1) is children’s irony
appreciation and processing related to their empathy skills? and (2) is children’s processing
of a speaker’s ironic meaning best explained by a modular or interactive theory?
Participants were thirty-one 8- and 9-year-olds children. We used a variant of the visual
world paradigm to assess children’s processing of ironic and literal evaluative remarks; in
this paradigm children’s cognition is revealed through their actions and eye gaze. Results
in this paradigm showed that children’s irony appreciation and processing were correlated
with their empathy development, suggesting that empathy or emotional perspective
taking may be important for development of irony comprehension. Further, children’s
processing of irony was consistent with an interactive framework, in which children
consider ironic meanings in the earliest moments, as speech unfolds. These results
provide important new insights about development of this complex aspect of emotion
recognition.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the challenges children face in developing emotion recog-
nition is created by the fact that people often convey emotions
indirectly, for example, through use of verbal irony. Verbal irony
is a complex language device used by speakers who intend to
convey an attitude that is of opposite valence to the meaning
of the words spoken. Verbal irony is used for a wide variety of
social purposes: to mute the effect of criticism in some instances
and exacerbate the effect of criticism in others, to be humorous,
and to manage relationships (see Pexman, 2008, for a review).
Comprehension of irony requires the listener to use cues like tone
of voice in order to infer the attitude and emotions of the speaker.
This type of emotional perspective taking can be challenging for
children and research suggests that irony appreciation develops
over a long developmental window in middle childhood (Pexman
and Glenwright, 2007). While there is as yet no developmental
theory of irony appreciation, there is growing interest in the issue
of how children reason about these statements.
As the most common type of verbal irony (Capelli et al., 1990),
sarcasm involves a positively worded statement which is meant to
be taken negatively. This language device is also referred to as an
ironic criticism; for example, if you were to say “you’re really good
at that” when a friend fails at a sport. This form of irony is the
focus of the current study.
Understanding irony is a complex process; it involves under-
standing the attitude and emotion of the speaker and also the
impact they intend their statement to have. As such, irony is
thought to be more difficult to process than other falsehoods,
such as deception (Demorest et al., 1984). In order to appre-
ciate verbal irony, one needs to understand that the speaker of
the statement did not intend for the meaning of the words to
be taken literally, that their belief about the situation was dif-
ferent than the literal meaning of their words, and that they
deliberately intended for this falsehood to be detected. Finally,
there needs to be an understanding of why the speaker would
make such a statement. Children begin to appreciate these aspects
of ironic intent between 6 and 10 years of age (Pexman and
Glenwright, 2007; Filippova and Astington, 2008), with appre-
ciation becoming more sophisticated through middle childhood
and into adolescence (Demorest et al., 1984; Pexman et al., 2005).
Previous research has mapped out the age range during which
children’s irony appreciation skills develop, but we know very lit-
tle about the relationship of irony appreciation to other aspects of
emotional development.
THE ROLE OF EMPATHY
One goal of the present study was to assess the relationship of
irony appreciation to empathy or emotional perspective taking
skills. Empathy is the identification or reaction of one person to
the experience of another and is thought to include a number of
components, including empathic concern and perspective taking
(e.g., Davis, 1983). Several researchers have proposed that emo-
tional perspective taking, and in particular the ability to under-
stand the emotions and attitudes behind others’ mental states, is
important to irony comprehension (Martin andMcDonald, 2005;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Dennis et al., 2013). For instance,
Shamay-Tsoory et al. examined irony appreciation in patients
with brain damage to the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), an area responsible for interpreting the emotional, or
affective aspects of stimuli, particularly related to mental states.
These participants performed well on classic second-order false
belief tasks, but failed at irony and faux-pas detection. The
researchers suggested that in order to understand irony, one must
go beyond a cognitive appraisal of mental states to interpret the
emotional aspects of the other’s mind, acquiring insight into
the “attitude” layer of understanding. This research supports the
idea that emotional understanding is particularly important to
understanding irony but, to our knowledge, this relationship has
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never been tested in irony appreciation for typically developing
children.
Certainly, there is evidence that children’s understanding of
emotion and emotional expression develops over the same devel-
opmental timeframe as does irony appreciation (Pons et al.,
2004). From 6 to 10 years emotion recognition becomes more
sophisticated and also increasingly right-lateralized in typical
development (Watling and Bourne, 2007). During this time
frame, children also come to appreciate the possibility that emo-
tions can be controlled or regulated (Gnepp and Hess, 1986).
Irony is one such strategy. Further, there are individual differences
in children’s emotion recognition and emotional perspective tak-
ing skills (Cutting and Dunn, 1999), and some of this variability
could be related to differences in irony appreciation.
THE PROCESS OF IRONY APPRECIATION
Much of the previous developmental research has evaluated the
product of children’s irony appreciation, rather than the process.
Yet there are different theoretical frameworks for irony processing
(for a review, see Gibbs and Colston, 2012) and it is impor-
tant that we evaluate which of these is the better description of
children’s behavior.
On the one hand, a set of modular theories posit that a lit-
eral interpretation of the statement must be accessed first, before
the perceiver can consider other, non-literal interpretations. This
view stems from Grice’s (1975) standard pragmatic approach. A
prominent exemplar of this set of theories is the graded salience
hypothesis (Giora, 1997), which suggests that since a literal inter-
pretation is almost always the most salient meaning for a lis-
tener, it will be processed first. Only when it is judged that the
literal interpretation does not fit within the context can the lis-
tener move on to a non-literal interpretation (see also Dews and
Winner, 1999; Schwoebel et al., 2000). As such, understanding
ironic meaning involves extra inferential processes, and should
thus take longer, than understanding literal meaning.
On the other hand, the interactive approach suggests that
ironic statements need not be processed in a serial fashion.
Instead, ironic meanings can be accessed from the earliest
moments of processing if ironic intent is congruent with the
context (Gibbs, 1986). Parallel constraint satisfaction is a promi-
nent interactive theory which suggests cues are processed rapidly
and in parallel and an ironic interpretation is considered as soon
as there is evidence that it might be appropriate (Katz, 2005;
Pexman, 2008). As such, it should not necessarily take longer to
process an ironic statement than a literal statement.
Typically these claims have been tested in reading time stud-
ies with adult participants. Some of these studies have found that
participants take longer to read an ironic vs. a literal statement,
suggesting that irony appreciation involves extra inferential pro-
cesses as predicted by modular accounts (e.g., Dews and Winner,
1999; Filik and Moxey, 2010; Akimoto et al., 2012). In contrast,
other reading studies have reported that, with supportive context,
ironic statements can be processed just as fast and in some cases
faster than their literal counterparts (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; Ivanko and
Pexman, 2003), lending support to interactive theories.
One limitation of the reading time studies, however, is that
while one can collect information about which type of statement
takes longer to process, one does not learn much about why pro-
cessing is slowed. That is, the method reveals differences in total
processing time but does not provide insight about the cause of
those processing differences. Recently, the visual world paradigm
has emerged as a new method for studying processing, and one
that provides more information about the nature of processing
(Huettig et al., 2011). By this paradigm, it is assumed that “the
mind is going where the eye is going” (Trueswell and Gleitman,
2004, p. 320). Thus, one can assess thinking processes through
looking behavior.
For instance, Kowatch et al. (2013) devised a variant of the
visual world paradigm to explore adults’ irony processing. In
what was described as “the shopping task,” a speaker delivered
literal or ironic statements about what they wanted to buy (e.g.,
I just love apples) and participants were asked to select, from two
objects placed on either side of a tabletop (e.g., an apple and an
orange), the one the speaker wanted and to put it in a small shop-
ping cart in the center of the tabletop. Participants’ eye gaze to
the objects was tracked by digital video, so the researchers could
investigate not only how long it took participants to make their
decisions about speaker intent, but also which meaning (object)
they considered (looked to, reached for) during the decisionmak-
ing process. Results showed that ironic requests (I just love apples)
were processed in the same time as literal negations (I just hate
apples). Perhapsmore importantly, after hearing an ironic remark
participants tended to look first to the object corresponding to an
ironic interpretation, and did so just as readily as they did to the
object corresponding to a literal interpretation following a literal
remark. Thus, there was no evidence of a bias to process the lit-
eral meaning first; ironic interpretations were considered in early
moments of processing.
Since children do not usually have the reading skills required
for reading time studies, the visual world paradigm provides a
viable method of studying irony processing in children. In addi-
tion, the visual world paradigm minimizes verbal demands on
child participants, as their response is manual (object selection)
and they are not asked to justify their selection. Climie and
Pexman (2008) devised the first such study. In their paradigm,
5- to 8-year-olds children watched a series of short puppet shows.
In each show, children heard one puppet make a literal or ironic
statement, and made a judgment about the speaker’s intent by
placing one of two toys in an answer box. Children were trained in
advance to select one toy, the smiling yellow duck, if the speaker
was being “nice,” and to select the other toy, a snarling shark, if
the speaker was being “mean.” Climie and Pexman examined chil-
dren’s eye-gaze to the two response objects in order to gain insight
about which meanings children considered during processing of
literal and ironic statements. On hearing an ironic remark, chil-
dren tended to look to the toy that corresponded with an ironic
interpretation first, suggesting that processing of a literal interpre-
tation is not obligatory, and that children seem to be considering
an ironic interpretation very early in processing. These findings
lend support to the constraint-satisfaction framework.
Although Climie and Pexman’s (2008) findings were taken
as evidence that children’s irony processing is best described
by an interactive theory, like the parallel constraint satisfaction
framework, an important issue remains. In Climie and Pexman’s
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procedure, children heard the speaker’s statement and then were
prompted to respond by the experimenter. Eye gaze data were
gathered only after the experimenter’s prompt. This left a gap of
up to several seconds in processing time between the onset of the
literal or ironic remark and the beginning of data collection. Yet
it is possible that children began processing the ironic meaning at
an earlier moment, as the ironic remark unfolded, and that if this
early processing were assessed there would be evidence that the
literal meaning was considered first. One goal of the present study
was to devise a variant of the visual world paradigm that would
allow assessment of the earliest moments of children’s irony pro-
cessing, in order to determine whether those moments are best
characterized by a modular or interactive theory.
THE PRESENT STUDY
In order to measure the earliest moments of children’s processing
of irony, we devised a modified version of Climie and Pexman’s
(2008) shark/duck task. In this new visual world task, the state-
ments all took similar form (in the Climie and Pexman study
the words in the target statements varied on each trial making
it difficult to compare processing across statements) and chil-
dren were trained to respond on each trial without a verbal cue
from the experimenter. That is, in the context of short puppet
shows, participants were presented with ironic statements (“that
was so good”), literal criticisms (“that was so bad”), and literal
compliments (“that was so good”). In this way processing for
ironic remarks could be compared to that for a statement of
opposite intent but the same wording (literal compliment) and
opposite wording but similar intent (literal criticism). Children
were trained in advance that, on each trial, if a speaker puppet
made a positive evaluation of the target puppet’s performance
they were to pick up the duck and put it in the answer box, and if
the speaker puppet made a negative evaluation they were to pick
up the shark and put it in the answer box. Children’s behavior was
video recorded to allow analysis of their eye gaze and responses as
each statement unfolded in real time. In addition, we separately
assessed children’s empathy and language skills in order that we
could evaluate the relationship of these skills to irony appreciation
and processing.
Predictions
If empathy skills are important to development of irony appre-
ciation, then we predicted that children’s empathy would be
related to both the product and process of their irony appre-
ciation. Consistent with previous research, children’s judgments
of speaker intent were expected to be more accurate for literal
than for ironic statements (e.g., Harris and Pexman, 2003; Climie
and Pexman, 2008). Children were also expected to be faster
in responding to literal compliments given the advantage for
processing positive literal statements found in previous research
(Ivanko and Pexman, 2003; Climie and Pexman, 2008; Kowatch
et al., 2013). For correctly interpreted trials, eye-gaze and reac-
tion time data were analyzed to test predictions of modular and
interactive theories of irony processing. According to modular
accounts, children should consider the literal response object
before the ironic object. Further, response times should be longer
for ironic statements than literal statements of the same valence.
In contrast, according to interactive accounts, children should
consider the ironic response object early, without first considering
the literal object, and their response times should be consistent
across statement types of the same valence.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The goal of the present study was to examine irony apprecia-
tion in children on the cusp of understanding ironic language.
Therefore, a group of thirty 6- and 7-year-olds were first tested,
as we expected these children to be just beginning to make accu-
rate assessments of speaker intent for ironic statements. This pilot
testing revealed that in this particular task, this age group had
near-zero accuracy for ironic statements. Consequently, a sec-
ond child group of thirty-one 8- and 9-year-olds (17 female)
was subsequently recruited and served as the main participant
group. These children were from middle-class families in the
Calgary area and were recruited through the Child and Infant
Learning and Development (Ch.I.L.D.) database at the University
of Calgary. Descriptive statistics for this group are presented in
Table 1.
All participants were required to have English as their first
language in order to properly comprehend the procedure, and
to have had no prior participation in irony-based studies at the
University of Calgary in order to avoid priming effects or bias
in the results. All participants were tested individually in an on-
campus laboratory and received a small prize for participating.
MATERIALS
Participants were shown a series of twelve short puppet show
scenarios (see examples in the Appendix). Each show consisted
of two puppets and relevant props and depicted scenarios that
should be familiar to children. There were a total of 24 puppets
used in the puppet shows and two additional puppets were used
in training. The puppets were dressed appropriately for the con-
text of the show (e.g., wearing outdoor gear for a winter setting),
and most stories involved the use of one or more props appropri-
ate to the context (e.g., a snowboard, an easel for painting, a boat
for water skiing).
Each of the puppet shows consisted of a short story involv-
ing two puppets, which ended in a statement uttered by one of
the puppets. There were three different statement types: six ironic
criticisms, three literal compliments, and three literal criticisms.
Table 1 | Participant characteristics.
Variable M (SD)
Age in months 110.48 (6.79)
CCC2 Structure 43.35 (6.72)
CCC2 Pragmatic 41.97 (7.33)
CCC2 Social 20.84 (4.65)
CCC2 Composite 85.68 (12.09)
EQ-C 36.97 (8.31)
CCC2 = Children’s Communication Checklist-2 (Bishop, 1998); EQ-C = Empathy
Quotient-Children (Auyeung et al., 2009).
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In order to counterbalance so that each puppet show was in each
statement condition at least once, four versions of the procedure
were created. In this way, across versions (and thus across partic-
ipants), each puppet show was presented in each literal condition
once and in the ironic condition twice. The order of shows for
each version was randomized using an online random list genera-
tor. These lists were then manually manipulated so there were no
more than two instances of the same statement type in a row (e.g.,
no more than two consecutive ironic criticisms). Additionally, the
order was manipulated so that in each version, the first puppet
show was a literal statement in order to provide an intonation
baseline; this allowed the participant to better understand the
speaker’s typical (i.e., sincere) tone of voice so that they could
detect any later intonation differences that might signal an ironic
tone of voice. Two versions began with a literal compliment and
two versions began with a literal criticism.
Participants were asked to make a judgment about the target
statement that came at the end of each puppet show. To do this,
participants were instructed to “show” the researcher their answer
by placing one of two toys—a “nice” duck and a “mean” shark—
in an answer box. Both were soft, plush toys, approximately 3–4′′
in length.
The experimenter and participant sat across from each other
at a table, which was set up as follows: the shark and duck toys
were placed at the edge of the table in front of the participant,
one on the right side, and one on the left side. For the duration
of the study, the location of the shark and duck stayed the same,
but their location was counterbalanced across participants. The
answer box in which the toy would be placed was in the middle of
the table, directly in front of the participant. For a visual depiction
of this set-up, see Figure 1.
Audio narration for the puppet shows was pre-recorded and
then played during the puppet shows so the narration was not
coming from the experimenter. The recorded speaker was of the
opposite gender to the experimenter to minimize likeness with
FIGURE 1 | Testing set up.
the experimenter. This was done to reduce the chance that the
participant would look to the experimenter for clarification, as
this would interfere with eye-gaze data.
To achieve consistency across trials the same statement was
recorded for each puppet show: “That was so good” for literal
compliments and ironic criticisms, and “That was so bad” for
literal criticisms. The critical statements for each of the three
conditions were similar in length (literal compliment: 1400ms;
literal criticism: 1567ms; ironic criticism: 1433ms). The criti-
cal word (“good” or “bad”) was uttered at a similar time point
in each statement (literal compliment: 933ms; literal criticism:
1033ms; ironic criticism: 1067ms). A separate group of five
adults who were blind to the study purpose were asked to rate
multiple samples of these statements on how literal or sarcas-
tic they were, based on prosody alone, without the context of
the story. The highest rated exemplars of each statement type
were then spliced into each corresponding puppet show record-
ing. Children’s eye gaze and reaching behaviors during the puppet
shows were recorded using a digital video camera sitting on a
tripod positioned over the experimenter’s shoulder, keeping the
child and the response objects in frame.
Parents were asked to fill out two questionnaires. The first
questionnaire was the empathy measure, the Empathy Quotient
for Children (EQ-C), which has been shown to have good relia-
bility and validity (Chapman et al., 2006; Auyeung et al., 2009).
The second questionnaire was the Children’s Communication
Checklist—2 (CCC2), a standard communication checklist that
has also been shown to have good reliability and validity (Bishop,
1998). We selected the CCC2 to estimate children’s language and
communication skills because it includes three aspects of commu-
nicative competence: language structure (subscales A, B, C, and
D), pragmatic (subscales E, F, G, andH), and social (subscales I, J)
dimensions. Children’s mean EQ-C and CCC2 (scaled) scores are
presented in Table 1.
PROCEDURE
The procedure involved several training trials, which highlighted
the use of the “nice” duck and the “mean” shark. Children were
trained to choose one of these objects, depending on whether
the participant interpreted the puppets’ statements as nice or
mean. It was emphasized that children should listen very carefully
to the puppet shows, and then make their decision without the
researcher giving a prompt. They were instructed to choose their
answer immediately following the conclusion of the puppet show,
placing either the shark or the duck in the answer box. The par-
ticipant practiced this procedure with the two practice puppets
for a maximum of four training puppet show scenarios (2 lit-
eral compliments, 2 literal criticisms, all different statements than
those used in the test trials) before beginning the experimental
trials.
CODING
Participants’ selections of the response objects were coded as
either correct or incorrect. Correct responses consisted of choos-
ing the shark for literal criticisms and ironic criticisms and choos-
ing the duck for literal compliments. If a verbal response was
given (1.08% of literal compliments, 2.15% of literal criticisms,
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and 1.61% of ironic criticisms), we coded only accuracy and
not latency. Using the video recording, eye gaze, and behav-
ioral response (arm-reach) latencies were coded frame-by-frame
by the experimenter. Arm reach behavior was coded in three
phases in order to examine early, middle, and late processing
(Climie and Pexman, 2008; Kowatch et al., 2013): (1) Early Phase:
from the beginning of the spoken critical statement (e.g., that
in “that was so good.”) to the initiation of hand/arm move-
ment by the participant; (2) Middle Phase: from the initiation
of the hand/arm movement to when the participant made con-
tact with their choice of response object; and (3) Late Phase:
from the touch of the response object to when the object was
placed in the answer box. Eye gaze was measured for the first
object that was fixated following the critical statement, and
for the proportion of looking time to the correct response
object.
A second coder, who was blind to the experimental purpose
or hypotheses, coded 25% of the video recordings. Agreement
between coders was acceptable: Early phase timing: intraclass cor-
relation coefficient (ICC) = 0.99, Middle phase timing: ICC =
1.00, Late phase timing= 1.00, Looks to shark: ICC= 0.98, Looks
to duck: ICC = 0.98, Time looking to shark: ICC = 0.98, Time
looking to duck: ICC = 0.99.
RESULTS
ACCURACY
The proportions of trials on which participants responded cor-
rectly in their assessment of speaker intent were examined for
each of the three statement types (Figure 2). Participants were
at ceiling in accuracy for literal compliments (M = 1.00, SD =
0.00), so this condition was not included in further accuracy anal-
yses. A paired samples t-test was conducted on the accuracy scores
for the remaining two statement types, ironic criticisms and lit-
eral criticisms, and this showed that children were significantly
less accurate in their speaker intent actions for ironic criticisms
(M = 0.48, SD = 0.47) than for literal criticisms (M = 0.94,
SD = 0.18), t(30) = 4.55, p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of trials with correct speaker intent
actions across all three language types. Bars represent standard error.
Asterisk represents a significant difference in mean accuracy (p < 0.001).
RESPONSE LATENCIES
Arm-reach data was split into three phases in order to gain more
detailed information about the time-course of decision-making
(Climie and Pexman, 2008; Kowatch et al., 2013). Any trials on
which the response latency was more than 2.5 standard deviations
above the mean for each participant were removed as outliers
(<5% of trials). A summary of response latencies can be found
in Table 2.
Within-subjects One-Way ANOVAs were conducted to exam-
ine the response latencies for correct actions across the three
statement types, for each response phase. A significant effect of
statement type was found in the early phase, F(2, 32) = 5.97, p <
0.05, MSE = 544473.12. Follow up comparisons (adjusted for
multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni correction) revealed
children were significantly slower to initiate a reach to the cor-
rect object in the literal criticism condition (M = 2771.90ms,
SD = 737.72) than in the literal compliment condition (M =
2022.88ms, SD = 464.33), t(30) = 4.54, p < 0.017. Additionally,
children were significantly slower responding to ironic criticisms
(M = 2788.04ms, SD = 1168.27) than to literal compliments,
t(16) = 2.96, p < 0.017. There was no significant difference found
in response latencies for ironic criticism and literal criticism
conditions, t(16) = 0.05, p = 0.96.
There were no significant differences in response latency as a
function of statement type in either the middle phase, F(2, 32) =
2.96, p = 0.07, or the late phase of responses, F(2, 32) = 1.37, p =
0.27. Therefore, the only difference in processing speed reflected
in response latencies emerged in the earliest phase of processing.
EYE GAZE
For correct trials, proportions of first looks to the correct response
object (vs. the incorrect response object) were examined in
order to gain insight into which response alternative children
considered in the early moments of processing (Figure 3). A
within-subjects One-Way ANOVA revealed no significant effect of
statement type, with equivalent proportions of first looks for lit-
eral compliments (M = 0.90, SD = 0.20), literal criticisms (M =
0.85, SD = 0.29), and ironic criticisms (M = 0.84, SD = 0.27),
F(2, 22) = 0.19, p = 0.83. These data show that children tended
to look first to the correct object as they initiated their responses
to ironic statements, and did so just as often when responding to
literal statements.
Although children did not show any tendency to look to the lit-
eral response object first as they judged speaker intent for ironic
statements, we also examined their looking behavior across the
whole response to test whether there was evidence for a literal
bias for ironic statements in later looking behavior. The pro-
portion of time spent looking at the correct object across the
entire response was examined with a within-subjects One-Way
ANOVA. Results showed no significant effect of statement type on
proportion of looking time to the correct object, F(2, 22) = 0.35,
p = 0.71. The proportion of looks to the correct object was equiv-
alent across literal compliment (M = 0.86, SD = 0.18), literal
criticism (M = 0.90, SD = 0.13) and ironic criticism (M = 0.85,
SD = 0.18) statement types.
For incorrectly interpreted ironic criticisms, children showed
little tendency to look first to the shark (the correct response
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Table 2 | Mean response latencies (ms) for each phase of arm reach during speaker intent actions.
Early phase Middle phase Late phase Total
CORRECT RESPONSES
Literal compliment 2022.88 (464.33) 553.59 (146.04) 754.90 (148.53) 3226.34 (858.03)
Literal criticism 2771.90 (737.72) 607.19 (165.84) 975.49 (658.10) 3879.39 (1050.40)
Ironic criticism 2788.04 (1168.27) 516.56 (126.70) 809.08 (212.46) 4113.68 (1389.53)
INCORRECT RESPONSES
Ironic criticism 2905.82 (1894.20) 537.87 (129.48) 932.28 (378.45) 4375.97 (2175.79)
Values in parentheses indicate standard deviation.
FIGURE 3 | Mean proportion of first looks to the correct object on
correct trials. Bars represent standard error.
object, M = 0.10, SD = 0.24) and spent only a small proportion
of time looking at the shark across the whole response (M = 0.07,
SD = 0.14). Thus, at least in their looking behavior, there was lit-
tle evidence that children who responded incorrectly had implicit
understanding of ironic intent.
IRONY AND EMPATHY
In order to examine relationships between irony appreciation
and empathy, we first conducted correlation analyses (Table 3).
Results showed, not surprisingly, that children’s scores on the
CCC2 social subscale were positively related to their scores on the
EQ-C measure. Further, results showed that none of the language
subscales, composite scores, or children’s age (all factors that we
anticipated we might need to control in analyses of the relation-
ship between empathy and irony) were correlated with either
empathy or irony appreciation measures. As such, the correla-
tions could be interpreted without additional analyses controlling
for age or CCC2 scores. Notably, the results included several
significant correlations between aspects of children’s irony appre-
ciation and empathy. Higher empathy scores were associated with
a tendency to look first to the correct object following ironic state-
ments, and with a higher proportion of looks to the correct object
when appraising ironic intent. In addition, higher empathy scores
were associated with children’s accuracy on the speaker intent
response action. The speaker intent action accuracy data were
not normally distributed, however, as children tended to be either
quite accurate (above chance performance on this forced-choice
response, n = 15) or quite inaccurate (below chance performance
on this forced-choice response, n = 16). As such, we opted to
treat this aspect of children’s irony understanding as a categori-
cal variable and as a dependent measure in a logistic regression.
Children’s empathy was used as the only predictor and results
showed a significant relationship between children’s empathy
and their speaker intent action accuracy, B = 0.14, SE = 0.07,
p = 0.041, with stronger empathy associated with more accurate
speaker intent actions.
Additional insight is provided by the correlations for mea-
sures of children’ incorrectly interpreted ironic remarks. That is,
when children incorrectly interpreted speaker intent for ironic
criticisms, their response latencies (in particular, their early
phase response latencies) were correlated with their empathy
scores, such that children with higher empathy scores responded
more slowly on incorrect trials. This may suggest that chil-
dren with stronger empathy had greater implicit understanding
of ironic intent, and that understanding was strong enough to
slow their response but not strong enough to produce a correct
speaker intent action. In sum, the correlational results suggest
that empathy is related to both comprehension and process-
ing of ironic remarks, even when those remarks are interpreted
incorrectly.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the product
and process of children’s irony appreciation, and the role of empa-
thy in those aspects of communicative development. Previous
research examined children’s processing of irony, but used mea-
sures that left a gap of several seconds in which important
cognition could already have taken place (Climie and Pexman,
2008). The current study addressed this gap with a modified
procedure that allowed examination of both comprehension and
processing of ironic vs. literal statements in the earliest moments,
as the utterance was unfolding. Results address whether children
are utilizing a modular or interactive approach to processing,
and also draw links with other aspects of children’s emotional
development.
In their appraisals of speaker intent, results showed that chil-
dren were at, or near, perfect performance on both literal com-
pliments and criticisms. This suggested that literal statements are
much easier for children to understand than ironic statements.
Children’s speaker intent accuracy for ironic statements was at
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48%, significantly lower than accuracy in the literal criticism con-
dition. While this level of performance could be interpreted as
equivalent to chance (since there were two response options),
many irony researchers have argued that because literal language
is vastly more common than irony in everyday speech, the appro-
priate comparison for irony is not to chance; rather, one can
assume that the literal interpretation is more common and any
deviation from the literal interpretation is meaningful. Further,
examination of children’s speaker intent accuracy showed that
they tended to be either very accurate or not at all accurate. In
this light, the children’s speaker intent accuracy for ironic criti-
cisms suggests that some children in this age group are able to
appreciate ironic language. This suggests, further, that this age
group, in which children seem to be on the cusp of irony appre-
ciation (at least in present task conditions), is suitable for our
investigation of irony processing. That is, if any children were
inclined to show a literal bias in processing one would think it
would be children who are just beginning to understand ironic
language.
As expected, children’s response latencies showed a positive
advantage, in that they were faster to respond to positive state-
ments (literal compliments) than negative statements (literal crit-
icisms and ironic criticisms; Ivanko and Pexman, 2003; Climie
and Pexman, 2008; Kowatch et al., 2013). The present results
show, further, that this positive advantage emerged in the early
phase of responding. When processing of ironic remarks was
compared to processing of literal remarks of the same valence
(literal criticisms), however, the processing times were equiva-
lent. Modular theories suggest that listeners follow a stage-like
process of interpreting and then rejecting a literal interpretation
before moving on to an ironic interpretation; as such, pro-
cessing should take longer for ironic criticisms than for literal
criticisms (Dews and Winner, 1999). Children in the present
study were not slower responding to ironic vs. literal criticisms,
suggesting that processing irony does not necessarily involve
extra inferences, consistent with interactive theories (Pexman,
2008).
Eye-gaze behavior provided further insight. Children’s first
looks were examined to investigate the meanings that children
were initially considering as they made their speaker intent judg-
ments. Results showed that for ironic statements that were cor-
rectly appraised, children looked to the correct, ironic response
object the majority of the time, and did so just as often as they
looked to the correct, literal response object following literal state-
ments. As such, first look data suggest children do not need to
consider a literal interpretation of an ironic utterance and then
reject the literal interpretation in favor of an ironic interpretation,
as modular theories would posit (e.g., Giora, 1997). Instead, chil-
dren are able to consider an ironic interpretation from the earliest
moments (Katz, 2005; Pexman, 2008). Beyond the first look, we
also examined the proportion of time children spent looking at
the correct object. Across children’s responses we found no sig-
nificant differences between the literal conditions and the ironic
condition, suggesting that children do not give extra considera-
tion to the literal meaning when processing ironic statements. As
such, children’s eye gaze behavior provides support to interactive
theories of irony processing.
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In order to explore the relationship of irony comprehension
and processing to emotional perspective-taking skills, correla-
tional analyses were conducted. Results showed that children’s
speaker intent action accuracy, first looks to the correct object,
and proportion of looks to the correct object following correctly
interpreted ironic statements were each significantly correlated
with children’s scores on the EQ-C, a measure of empathy.
Further, there was evidence that children’s empathy scores were
related to their implicit awareness of ironic intent for incor-
rectly interpreted ironic remarks. As such, the present results
confirm claims made by Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005) about the
importance of empathy or emotional perspective taking to irony
understanding, but here we tested them directly. Results showed
that children who were judged by their parents to have rela-
tively strong empathy skills were, in our shark/duck task, able
to judge speaker intent for irony more accurately, and tended
to look first and for a greater proportion of their response time
to the correct response object. These findings provide important
new clues about how irony detection and processing fit into the
larger context of children’s emotional development. One inter-
pretation of our findings is that the reason irony appreciation is
slow to develop (extending into adolescence) is because it requires
advanced skills in assessing the affective consequences of others’
language and an ability to detect attitudes even when they are
conveyed indirectly.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to consider
associations between children’s irony appreciation and empa-
thy skills, and also the first to measure the earliest moments of
children’s processing of ironic speech. Certainly, there are lim-
itations to the present work. In order to study processing we
created a communicative environment that was impoverished as
it lacked many of the cues that would be available in everyday
language, such as facial expression and knowledge of the speaker.
In addition, our study was limited to ironic criticisms, and did
not consider children’s appreciation of the less common but
related form known as ironic compliment (i.e., a literally negative
statement intended as praise, see e.g., Pexman and Glenwright,
2007). Further, we assessed children’s empathy skills indirectly
and with a unidimensional measure, by asking parents to rate
children’s empathy skills on a standard scale. The fact that we
observed relationships between parents’ ratings and children’s
interpretive behavior even under these circumstances suggests
that a strong association may be present, one that should be
investigated in a more fine-grained way in future research. In
particular, it will be important to identify which aspects of empa-
thy (e.g., cognitive vs. affective) are most strongly associated with
irony appreciation.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present study we modified the visual world paradigm
to tap the earliest moments of children’s processing dur-
ing the unfolding of a spoken ironic statement. Results from
response latency and eye gaze measures support an interac-
tive framework, suggesting that, like adults, children consider
an ironic interpretation in the earliest phases of process-
ing. Empathy was strongly associated with several aspects of
irony comprehension and processing, suggesting that emo-
tional reasoning abilities are important to development of
irony comprehension. By establishing this link between emo-
tional development and irony comprehension in typical devel-
opment we corroborate findings from studies of populations
who struggle with both of these domains, such as children with
Autism Spectrum Disorder (Pexman et al., 2011), and brain-
damaged patients (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). Appreciation
of speaker intent for ironic language is a remarkable devel-
opmental achievement, and one that highlights the increasing
sophistication of children’s emotion recognition skills in middle
childhood.
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLE PUPPET SHOW SCENARIOS
The soccer scenario
Shannon and John play on a soccer team together. It is the last few
minutes of a game. Shannon kicks the ball, (scoring a goal in the
last minute of the game/missing the net entirely). John says:
Literal Compliment: That was so good.
Literal Criticism: That was so bad.
Ironic Criticism: That was so good.
The dinner scenario
Gary and Lucy are eating dinner one night. For
dessert, Lucy brings out a cake that she had baked
earlier in the day. The cake tastes (delicious/terrible).
Gary says:
Literal Compliment: That was so good.
Literal Criticism: That was so bad.
Ironic Criticism: That was so good.
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